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How does electoral accountability affect the effectiveness of terrorism prevention in a democ- 
racy? We analyze the connection between electoral accountability and policy effectiveness in 
the context of terrorism prevention. We develop a formal model of an interaction between a 
government, a minority community, and a representative voter. All actors share the objective 
of terrorism prevention and have symmetric information. We show that electoral pressures to 
be successful in terrorism prevention create a commitment problem for the government and 
this can lead to less security. If the representative voter cares more about terrorism prevention, 
the government intensifies anti-terrorism activities that are under its direct control, but 
cooperation by the minority community weakens, and, as a result, security may decrease. We 
also show that commitment to ex-post suboptimal anti-terrorism activity is desirable for the 
government, but such commitment is difficult to achieve without explicit institutional 
constraints such as an effective judicial review on government’s antiterrorism actions. 
JEL Code: D70. 


















November 21, 2009 1 Introduction
The 9/11 terrorist attacks revealed important vulnerabilities in existing terrorism policy and placed
ghting terrorism at the top of most government's policy agenda. The prospect of suicide terrorism
combined with the possibility of large-scale catastrophic terrorist attacks necessitated a more active
government anti-terrorism policy, and, in particular, a change from a strategy of reacting, investi-
gating and prosecuting individuals after a terrorist attack to a strategy of terrorism prevention.
Yet, terrorism prevention is a policy issue that is not exclusively under the government's control;
rather, its eectiveness also depends on the actions of other, to some extent, independent actors.
Large-scale spectacular terrorist attacks need extensive preparation and planning. The communities
in which terrorists have their roots can aect the probability of terror attacks in multiple ways,
from the extent to which proto-terrorist activities such as fundraising for terrorist organizations
or incitement to violence are considered acceptable in the community up to the direct provision of
information about individuals who might be attracted to radical ideas, connected to terrorists, or
actively planning a terrorist attack.
In such a setting, a more robust government anti-terror policy (say, more intensive surveillance,
quicker and more extensive use of deportation for non-citizens suspected of extremist activities or,
more extremely, the degree to which terrorism suspects are subjected to \enhanced interrogation")
can be a two-edged sword. Even if a particular policy occasionally yields information that may
disrupt terrorist organizations or specic attack plots, it also leads to alienation and antagonism in
the community and may induce them to cooperate less.
Thus, there exists an important trade-o, and we analyze how this trade-o is aected by
increased focus of the electorate on the issue of terrorism prevention. Democratic governments
plausibly have two interrelated incentives to care about terror prevention. First, they are likely
to share citizens' security concerns, and in this respect, they are perfect agents for the electorate.
Second, a government that fails to prevent a terror attack is less likely to be reelected, as a dening
characteristic of democracy is the power of the citizens to hold the government accountable for its
policies.
We build a formal model to argue that electoral pressure to be successful in terrorism preven-
tion can lead to less security. The negative eect may seem counterintuitive, as a core belief of
democratic theory is that electoral accountability induces the government to achieve those policy
outcomes preferred by voters. However, we show that increased incentives for the government to
work on terrorism prevention may be counterproductive if the overall policy success does not solely
depend on the actions of the government, even if all actors share the goal of preventing a terrorist
attack.
The players in our game are the government, a minority community and a representative voter.
The government chooses a level of anti-terrorism activities to collect information about possible
terrorist threats. The minority community chooses a level of cooperation to provide the government
information about possible terrorist threats. The government's and the community's actions jointly
determine the likelihood of preventing a terrorist attack. Both the government and the minority
1community prefer to prevent a terrorist attack, and have a cost for their actions. However, a higher
level of government anti-terror activity imposes a negative externality on the minority community.
The government receives a direct benet from preventing a terrorist attack, but also aims to be
reelected. The representative voter decides whether to reelect the incumbent government and the
equilibrium probability that the representative voter reelects the incumbent government depends
on whether the government succeeds in preventing a terrorist attack.
The game-theoretic analysis shows that the equilibrium probability of a terrorist attack can
increase if the representative voter is more likely to reelect the government if the government is
more successful in preventing a terrorist attack. This is a somewhat counterintuitive result since
there is no divergence of preference between the government, the minority community, and the
representative voters: all actors prefer to prevent a terrorist attack. The government cares about
preventing terrorism and also about reelection, and the representative voter is more likely to reelect
the government if the government is more successful in preventing a terrorist attack. However,
the electoral pressure creates a commitment problem: The government increases the level of anti-
terrorism activities under its direct control, and for a xed level of minority community cooperation,
this would decrease the probability of a terrorist attack. However, the alienation that arises as a
side eect of those more aggressive anti-terrorism actions induce the community to cooperate less
with the government, with the potential eect of increasing the probability of a terrorist attack.
An important issue that arises in our analysis is whether the government can commit to a par-
ticular level of counter-terrorist activities. If it can, then we show that it will use this commitment
to induce the minority community to cooperate more than they would in the equilibrium of the
simultaneous game. Moreover, if the government can commit, then we show that an increase in the
electoral incentives to prevent a terror attack necessarily reduce the probability of a terror attack in
equilibrium. However, we also show that simply \moving rst" in a dynamic game does not enable
the government to commit to a dierent level of anti-terrorist activity than is optimal ex-post (i.e.,
given the community's reaction), unless the activity level is perfectly and costlessly observable for
the minority community. If, instead, the minority community only observes an imperfect signal of
the government's anti-terror policy, then the equilibrium actions of the government and the com-
munity in the sequential game in which the government moves rst are exactly the same as those
in a simultaneous game. As perfect observability of actions is very implausible to be satised in the
context of government anti-terrorist activities, this shows that, without a recourse to institutions
that explicitly constrain the government's ability to implement certain policies in its ght against
terrorism, commitment is very hard to achieve.
Several policy implications for the current debate regarding how liberal societies have responded
to the perceived terrorist threat arise from our model. The analysis shows that excessive government
targeting minority communities can arise as an equilibrium outcome even if it is counterproductive
(i.e., reduces the equilibrium security level) and the government has strong electoral incentives to
be successful in terrorism prevention. Our results provide a new security rationale for institutions
that, at least to some extent, tie the hands of the government in its struggle against terrorism.
2For example, checks and balances on the government's antiterrorism actions such as judicial review
may in fact increase the security level of a society, even if they directly inhibit some anti-terror
activities of the government.
We proceed as follows. In Section 3, we discuss the contribution of this paper to the literature
on democratic accountability and the political economy literature on terrorism. Section 4 presents
a very simple example with binary actions that highlights the main eects. The general model and
its analysis follow in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 presents a parametric example with continuous
actions, and shows exactly under which conditions the perverse eect of a decrease in equilibrium
security as a result of increased electoral concerns about terrorism arises. Finally, in Sections 8 and
9, we discuss the policy implications and conclude.
2 The Policy of Terrorism Prevention
The main ingredient of our formal model is the interplay of government and minority community in
terrorism prevention, and the potential of government actions meant to protect against terrorism
to also antagonize the \minority community", jeopardizing their cooperation. In this section, we
discuss the dierent policies of terror prevention and the causation channels that we have in mind.
We rst discuss anti-terror activities that are under the direct control of the government. Al-
though liberal democracies have experienced terrorism before 9/11, the specic nature of the post
9/11 terrorist threat adds to the diculties of terrorism prevention. In comparison with other ter-
rorist organizations, Al Qaeda is untypical in that it is a rather loose network united by a radical
ideology that inspires the formation of suicide terrorist cells both outside the borders of liberal
democracies and inside the Muslim communities residing in liberal democracies.
This amorphous structure presents a dicult challenge for terror prevention. Given the openness
of liberal democratic countries, it is very dicult to stop all potential terrorists at the borders, as the
9/11 attacks show. Furthermore, as sizable Muslim communities exist in most liberal democracies,
governments also need to respond to the threat of homegrown terrorism, a threat evidenced by the
7/7 London attacks.
Regardless of whether the terrorist threat comes from outside or from within the country, large-
scale spectacular terrorist attacks need planning. The government can use a variety of dierent
antiterrorism actions to target the resources terrorists have for planning and executing their attacks,
to lower the access of terrorists to the country and to disrupt existing terrorist activities.
Internationally, the government can use a range of military actions to disrupt the recruitment,
planning and training activities of terrorist organizations in certain geographical locations. For
example, the United States has used military force in a counterterrorist mode in Afghanistan in
an attempt to clean out one of the worlds prime terrorist safe havens and to topple a regime that
has been in a close partnership with terrorist groups. In countries such as Pakistan, the CIA often
uses unmanned planes (\Predator" drones) to kill suspected terrorists; this is often successful,
but there are also reports of mistakes and unintended civilian casualties as a consequence of such
3operations, and large parts of the Pakistani population appear to be unhappy with the violation of
their country's sovereignty.
When capturing suspected terrorists, a choice variable for the government is how intensively
information is extracted from those detainees. For example, which interrogation techniques can be
used on these detainees? For example, can they be subjected to sleep deprivation, waterboarding
or other forms of torture, either directly by the government or after rendition to other countries?
The intensity of interrogation may make a dierence as to which information terror subjects are
willing to divulge, but may also aect how willing other actors (whether foreign governments, or
foreign or domestic individuals) are to support terrorists or to cooperate with the government in
ghting terrorism.
For example, British journalist Johann Hari cites several former Islamic militants on their mo-
tivations to turn to terrorism, as well as the eects that anti-terror policies had on their recruiting
eorts for terrorist organizations.1 Maajid Nawaz, a British-born islamist who moved to Egypt in
2001 and began recruiting students into radicalism, is quoted as saying: \There was an inhibiting
sympathy for the victims of 9/11 { until the Bush administration began to respond with Guan-
tanamo Bay and bombs. That made it much easier. After that, I could persuade people a lot
faster."
Domestically, the government can use a range of policies that target terrorist threats at dierent
points during the preparation and planning process of a terrorist attack. For example, in the very
early stages of an attack, tougher immigration and asylum policies, such as denying entry into the
country to aliens suspected of being associated with or supporting terrorist activity, may make it
harder for potential terrorists to enter or to remain in the country. Most Western governments
have engaged in such tougher immigration policies after 9/11. For example, in the United States,
the FBI working with the Immigration and Naturalization Service arrested almost 800 individuals
for immigration violations during their investigation of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Jacobson 2006).
The government can also engage in tougher intelligence collection and surveillance activities to
obtain information about terrorist threats by using some known characteristics of future terrorists
from the prole of past terrorists. Since suicide terrorists have come disproportionately from certain
religious and ethnic communities, any eective anti-terror intelligence and surveillance operation
will focus primarily on those communities.2
After 9/11, governments in Western Europe and United State have directed their surveillance
activities towards the Muslim communities. Yet, this approach is also problematic in that it
alienates this community whose cooperation can be essential for terrorism prevention. For example,
since the 9/11 attacks in New York, 32 percent of British Muslims report being subjected to
discrimination at airports, and stops and searches of British Asians increased ve times after the
1Johann Hari, \Renouncing Islamism: To the brink and back again", The Independent, November 16, 2009.
2Theoretical work on proling show that the optimal strategy for the government is to prole on the basis of the
elasticity to crime in dierent groups (Persico 2004). If the elasticity to engage in suicide terrorism is a lot higher in
a certain community than in other segments of society, the government's optimal strategy is to focus its surveillance
on that community.
4June 2007 attempted bombings in London and Glasgow. In Germany, police have used preventive
powers to conduct mass identity checks outside major mosques. In France and Italy, raids on homes,
businesses, and mosques have targeted Muslims, particularly those considered religiously observant
(Open Justice Initiative 2009). In the United States, the FBI launched a mosque counting project
in March 2003, in which agents were asked to document the number of mosques in their areas, in
order to help measure the number of terrorism investigations that the various eld oces should
be expected to open and pursue. Also, before the 2004 Presidential election, the FBI launched a
so-called October Plan indiscriminately \interviewing" Muslims.
In our formal model, we capture the intensity of all these government anti-terror policies by just
one variable. The important point is that a more robust government policy always increases the
probability of \false positives". People without evil intentions in the minority community (or others
abroad with whom the minority community identies) are likely to be inconvenienced, subjected to
duress or even be killed as a consequence of government policies, and our model assumes that the
way of treatment does aect the attitude of these minority communities towards the government,
and that this aects their willingness to cooperate with the government.
We call the other player in our formal model the \minority community", but depending on con-
text, this could stand for both domestic and international communities that have a special relation
with (potential) terrorists, in particular in the sense that many members of terrorist organizations
come from this community, that terrorists rely on support by community members.
Those communities consist mostly of people who do not wish to engage in terrorism themselves
and oppose violence as a political means. They can take a range of actions to prevent terrorist
attacks. First, the community can actively discourage extremism and violent activities thus increase
the cost of terrorism by making less acceptable as an activity. Second, the community can discourage
its members from providing active and passive support to terrorists that are actively planning
an attack. Terrorists need recruits, money, tactical and organizational help to plan an attack,
logistical and nancial support that communities from which terrorists come could provide. Third,
the community could come forth with information about terrorist activities and tip o the the
government about suspicious behavior and activities. The community has better information about
their members' behavior because the community members are closer to the individuals that might
be attracted to radical ideas, connected to terrorists, or actively planning a terrorist attack.
Numerous researchers and security ocials underscore that importance of communities for pre-
venting terrorism. Thomas Mockaitis argues that terrorist organizations \can only be defeated
with precise intelligence that allows for the highly focused and limited use of force. The intelligence
can only come from the larger communities in which the insurgent terrorists operate" (Mockaitis
2003). Along the same lines, Paul Wilkinson writes that co-opting the communities to provide
intelligence is the \secret of winning the battle against terrorism in an open society" (Wilkinson
2006). Similarly, a senior counterterrorism ocial in the Netherlands stated, \community relations
are crucial to gathering information" to prevent terrorist attacks.3
3James A. Goldston and Rachel Neild. Ethnic proling fails Europe - Editorials & Commentary - International
5There is of course a trade-o here. If the government increases its antiterrorism activities
directed at the community at large, distrust between the communities and the government develops.
The government's antiterrorism activities directed at minority communities at large alienate these
communities and makes them less likely to provide useful information to the law enforcement and
intelligence agencies. There is ample anecdotal evidence that the disproportionate antiterrorism
activities directed at minority communities at large has the eect of alienating these communities.
For example, in the United State, Muslim groups say that surveillance techniques authorized by the
Patriot Act are alienating potential allies against terrorism (Christian Science Monitor September
2009). Along the same lines, in the United States, a rift has developed between Muslims and
FBI over suspicion of wide spread mosque surveillance. Islamic organizations feel betrayed by a
nationwide pattern of abuse and violations of civil rights, as well as religious rights (Christian
Science Monitor March 25, 2009). Moreover, the aggressive preemptive foreign policy of the United
States has contributed to the alienation of the Muslim community.
3 Existing Literature
The paper contributes to the political economy literature on terrorism as well as the political econ-
omy literature on democratic accountability. The political economy literature on terrorism and
counterterrorism addresses several critical questions about terrorism, including the structural de-
terminants of terrorism (Li 2005; Abadie 2006; Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapan 2004; Enders and
Sandler 2006), the optimal (or suboptimal) domestic or international counterterrorism policy (En-
ders and Sandler 1993; Rosendor and Sandler 2004; Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Bueno de Mesquita
2007; Powell 2007a; Powell 2007b), radical mobilization (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007),
terrorism recruitment and support (Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Siqueira and Sandler 2006), strategies
to ght terrorism (Kydd and Walter 2006), and the internal politics of terrorist organizations (Chai
1993).
In contrast, the connection between terrorism prevention and the electoral concerns has not yet
received much attention in the political economy literature on terrorism. This topic is important
given that the democratic governments have to account for their policy results at the election day. In
this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model to analyze the eectiveness of terrorism prevention
in the context of electoral pressure. We show that an increase in the government's utility from
being reelected, or an increase in the dierence between reelection probabilities without and with
a terror attack, can result in a deterioration of the security situation: the probability of a terrorist
attack increases.
Bueno de Mesquita (2007) develops a model of interactions between voters, a government,
and a suspected terrorist. Bueno de Mesquita analyzes the optimal counterterrorism policy given
that counterterrorism allocations can be divided between observable and unobservable tactics.
In Bueno de Mesquita's model, agency problems between the voters and government create a
Herald Tribune.
6situation in which the counterterrorism strategy pursued by the government in response to electoral
and institutional incentives diers from the security maximizing counterterrorism strategy. In our
model, there is no agency problem between the voter and the government, the government, the
minority community and the voters all want to prevent a terrorist attack. In our model, increased
electoral pressures to be successful in terrorism prevention induces the government to act in a
potential suboptimal manner with the overall result of increasing the probability of a terrorist
attack.
The paper also contributes to the political economy literature on democratic accountability
(Manin 1997; Fearon 1999; Besley 2005). Scholars have noted two mechanisms of how elections can
hold the government accountable: sanctioning and selection (Key 1966; Fiorina 1981; Manin 1997,
Besley 2005; Fearon 1999). Most of the literature has been focused on analyzing the disciplining
eect of elections on elected politicians or the condition under which voters prefer a trustee or a
delegate representative. The exiting models fall into three categories: 1) moral hazard models, 2)
adverse selection models and 3) models combining both moral hazard and adverse selection.
We develop a model to analyze the eect of increased electoral accountability on policy perfor-
mance. Our model diers from the existing literature in that the government does not have full
control over achieving the desired policy outcome: the government strategically interacts with the
minority community, and both the government's and the minority community's action determine
the likelihood of a terrorist attack. As all actors prefer to prevent a terrorist attack, there is no
divergence of preference between the government, the minority community and the voters. We
show that electoral accountability possibly has a negative eect on terrorism prevention because it
creates a commitment problem: if preventing a terrorist attack is more important for reelection, the
government increases anti-terrorist activities that are under its direct control, but this increased
incentive is possibly counterproductive both for security and the agents' welfare.
4 A simple example
The following simple example illustrates the eect of increased electoral accountability on the
eectiveness of terrorism prevention. Let all players | the government, the minority community
and the voter | receive a payo of 100 if a terror attack is prevented and a payo of 0 if a terrorist
attack occurs. In addition, the government receives a payo of R = 200 if it is reelected.
The government has to choose whether to engage in \normal" surveillance s, or \excessive"
surveillance s, i.e s 2 fs;sg . The community can choose between a low level of cooperation, i, and
a high level of cooperation i, i.e i 2 fi;ig. These actions translate into the following probability of
a successful terrorist attack, i.e p(s;i):
Note that higher levels of s and i decrease the probability of a terror attack. Also, the coop-
eration of the minority community is quite critical here: A high level of cooperation reduces the
probability of an attack by 5 percentage points, while \excessive" surveillance (relative to \normal"




Table 1: Probability of a terrorist attack
The government's cost of excessive surveillance is cg = 3 and the government's cost of \normal"
surveillance is cg = 0. For the minority community, the cost of low cooperation is cc = 0 and the
cost of high cooperation depends on the level of surveillance chosen by the government. If the level
of surveillance is normal, the community has the same cost, cc = 0. In contrast, if surveillance is
excessive, the minority community has a cost of cc = 10 when choosing the high cooperation level.
This modeling assumption formalizes the idea that the government's anti-terrorism action impose
a negative externality on the community.
The representative voter observes whether a terrorist attack occurs or not and decides whether
to reelect the incumbent government or not. We are interested in the eect of increased electoral
pressure to prevent terror attacks on the overall level of security and the players' welfare. To
analyze this, we compare two situations. As a benchmark, suppose that the representative voter
does not condition his reelection decision on whether there is a terrorist attack or not. One can
imagine this as a situation before a major terrorist attack such as 9/11 occurs so that terrorism
is not on the voter's \radar screen". The voter may then be unwilling to punish the incumbent
government for a terror attack that is surprising for everybody. In this situation, the voter always
reelects the government regardless of whether a terrorist attack occurs or not.




Table 2: Payo matrix without reelection concerns
Clearly, s is a dominant strategy for the government. The community's best reply to s is ;i and
so (s;i) is the unique Nash equilibrium of this game.
In the second situation, let the representative voter increase her electoral pressure on the gov-
ernment to prevent a terror attack: the representative voter reelects the government if and only if
no terror attack occurs. In this case, payos are as follows.
In this situation, the government's dominant strategy is s and the community's best reply to
the government strategy is i. Consequently, the equilibrium of this game is (s;i).
4The payos can be derived as follows. Multiply 1 minus the probability of a terror attack (from Table 1) with
the respective payo from preventing an attack, and deduct the respective player's cost, if applicable. Finally, for




Table 3: Payo matrix with reelection concerns
It is interesting to note that all players are worse o in the above equilibrium compared to
the rst equilibrium: The probability of a terror attack is increased, so the voter, the minority
community and the government are worse o in term of receiving the payo from preventing a
terrorist attack, and the government, in addition, pays the cost of excessive surveillance.
The problem is that the threat of being voted out of oce if the government is not successful in
preventing a terrorist attack creates a commitment problem. In the second situation, the govern-
ment is doing more of whatever is under its direct control and as a result excessive surveillance s
a dominant strategy for the government. However, this strategy induces the community to be less
likely to cooperate with the government with the eect of all player being worse o.
5 The Model
5.1 Description
There are three players: the government, a minority community, and a representative voter. The
government chooses a level of antiterrorism actions that we denote s (for surveillance, though dier-
ent interpretations are possible), and which can be chosen from s 2 [0;s]: The minority community
chooses a level of cooperation with the government, denoted by i (for information provision, though
again dierent interpretations are possible), which is in i 2 [0;i]: The representative voter makes a
binary decision v 2 f0;1g, where 1 is interpreted as reelecting the government, and 0 as electing
the opposition instead.
Terrorist activity is captured by a binary variable T that takes either value 0 or 1, where T = 1
denotes a successful terror attack and T = 0 its absence or failure. The actions of the government
and the minority community translate into a probability of a successful terror attack, given by the
function p(s;i)  Prob(T = 1). This probability decreases in both arguments, and it is convex in





@i2 > 0. We allow for the cross partials to take any value. We say that the government's and
the community's actions are substitutes if
@2p
@s@i > 0 (i.e., an increase in i reduces the absolute value
of the marginal eect of s). Conversely, if
@2p
@s@i < 0, we say that s and i are complements.
The timing of the game is the following. The government and the minority community make
their decisions simultaneously. The representative voter then observes whether a terror attack
happens and decides whether to reelect the government or not.
Let Ug(T) be the government's direct payo if the terror outcome is Tinf0;1g. Clearly, we
assume that Ug(1) < Ug(0) (i.e., the government prefers that no terror attack occurs). Denote
9the dierence by g  Ug(0)   Ug(1). The government also cares about reelection and receives
an additional payo R if and only if reelected. Finally, a function cg measures the cost of the
government from engaging in preventive surveillance to foil a terrorist attack. Apart from tangible
costs of antiterror actions, cg(s) can also be thought of as including the psychological discomfort
of surveillance measures for (majority) citizens. In summary, the government's expected utility is
(1   p(s;i))  [Ug(0) + R  E(vjT = 0)] + p(s;i)[Ug(1) + R  E(vjT = 1)]   cg(s); (1)
where E(vjT) is the reelection probability given the realization of T.
The anti-terrorism activity of the government, s, imposes a negative externality on the minority
community. To formalized this notion, we assume that the minority community's utility Uc(T;s)
is decreasing in s, as s infringes on the civil liberties of the minority community. Furthermore,
we assume that an increased level of surveillance antagonizes the community and induces them
to care relatively less about terror prevention (we discuss this assumption in more detail below).
Technically, we assume that c(s)  Uc(0;s) Uc(1;s) > 0 (i.e., the community shares the objective
to prevent terror attacks), but 0
c < 0 (increased surveillance and the resulting antagonism reduce
the degree to which the minority community shares the social objective of terror prevention). The
function cc measures the cost of the minority community to provide information to the government.
We assume that the cost function is strictly convex (@2c
@i2 > 0) In summary, the minority group's
expected utility is
p(s;i)  Uc(1;s) + (1   p(s;i))  Uc(0;s)   cc(i) = Uc(0;s)   p(s;i)c(s)   cc(i): (2)
Alternatively, the negative externality of the government's anti-terrorism actions on the minority
community could have been formalized by assuming that the social objective of stopping a terrorist
attack is independent of s but that the marginal cost of the minority community for cooperating
with the government increases with an increase in s. That is, the minority community has a cost
for cooperating with the government cc(i;s) with a positive cross-partial, @2c
@i@s > 0. The idea is that
community members dislike it the more to report on the suspicious activities of fellow community
members the more aggressive the government is in its anti-terror policy. Both formulations of the
idea of a negative externality are plausible. In the analysis, we use the rst formulation but the
results are exactly the same if we use the second formulation.
The representative voter receives a utility UV (T;E) from reelecting the government, and utility
U0
V from electing the opposition. Here, E is the performance of the government in areas other than
terrorism prevention (such as the economic performance of the government), which is a random
variable at the time that the government chooses s. We assume that UV is decreasing in T. Since
the voter reelects the government if and only if UV (T;E)  U0
V , the probability that the voter
reelects the government if T = 0, denoted q0 is larger than the probability that the voter reelects
the government if T = 1, denoted q1.
105.2 Discussion of modeling assumptions
Congruence of objectives. All three actors share the objective of preventing a terror attack.
In particular, one can think of the government's and the voter's objectives as being closely aligned:
In fact, the terms g and cg in the government's objective function could be derived from the
citizens' utility. In this context, cg may be interpreted as the monetary costs of terror prevention,
but can also include citizens' dislike of antiterror methods that infringe on civil liberties of minority
communities.
The only divergence of objectives between the government and the voter arises from the fact
that the government is also interested in its reelection. Yet, since the prevention of a terror attack
is instrumental for the government's reelection bid, this divergence of objectives does not appear
to be particularly severe.
The government/voter and the minority community share the objective of preventing a terrorist
attack but the government's level of anti-terrorism activities imposes a negative externality on
the minority community. In the formulation we work with, the government's action aects the
intensity with witch the minority community prefers to prevent a terrorist attack. Note that, even
though the government's antiterrorism decreases the minority community's intensity of preferring
to prevent a terrorist attack in our formulation, we can allow for the minority community to have
a higher preference than the government for stopping terrorist attacks (if we were to make cardinal
comparisons of utility).
Voter behavior. The main focus of our model is not to advocate a specic model of voter
behavior, which is why we model voters in a reduced form by assuming that the representative
voter's utility from reelecting the incumbent government decreases when a terrorist attack occurs,
so that a terror attack lowers the reelection probability of the incumbent government. Several
microfoundations are consistent with such a decrease in the reelection probability, which is all we
need from the voting stage for the analysis of the interaction between government and minority
community. Gassebner et al. (2007) provide empirical evidence for a systematic connection between
terrorism prevention and election outcomes. They examine this relationship using a large data set
consisting of more than 800 elections in 115 countries over the period 1968-2002. Their empirical
results shows that terrorism increases the probability that the incumbent government is replaced at
the next election. The probability of a government change depends on the severity of the terrorist
attack. Terrorist attacks without casualties or injuries increase the probability of a government
change by only 1:3%, while terrorist attacks with at least one casualty increase the probability of
a government change with 20:3%.
A voting rule that reduces the reelection probability of the government after a terrorist attack
is consistent with both a retrospective and a prospective voting behavior and we do not need to
take any position on whether the voters decide retrospectively or prospectively. In a retrospective
voting interpretation, a terrorist attack decreases the voter's welfare, and the voter punishes the
incumbent government for the reduction in his welfare.
11Alternatively, it is also possible to derive the same voter behavior in a framework in which
voters are forward-looking, but update their beliefs about the unknown level of the government's
competence by taking past performance into account. For example, suppose that the government
can either be \high ability" or \low ability" with respect to preventing terror attacks. Ceteris
paribus (i.e. given equilibrium actions), high ability reduces the probability of a terror attack.
Since the occurrence of a terror attack is more likely if the government is less competent, the voter
rationally takes the occurrence of a terror attack as a bad signal for the incumbent government's
quality, and thus only votes for the incumbent government if performance in other areas outweighs
this negative eect. Consequently, a terror attack also decreases the reelection probability of the
government in this setup with purely forward-looking voters.
Sequence of moves. We assume that the government and the minority community make their
choices simultaneously. Eectively, this sequence prevents the government from committing to a
level of anti-terror activity that is not ex-post optimal from the perspective of maximizing the gov-
ernment's objective function. We return to the issue of whether it is plausible that the government
can commit in Section 6.3, where we show that commitment would require perfect and completely
costless observability of the government's actions by the community.
Alternatively, our model can be interpreted as a shortcut for a full dynamic model in which
behavior of the minority community depends on the government's behavior in the previous period.
In such a setup, the government has at least some incentive to disregard the negative consequences
that increasing s has on future cooperation by the minority community, as the government is
primarily concerned with preventing a terror attack \on its watch" in the present period, rather
than with the long run consequences that may materialize later (and under a dierent government).
No terrorist organization as player. While our model is concerned with the prevention of
terrorist attacks, we do not have a terror organization as a strategic player in the game. This setup
allows us to focus the model on the interaction between the electorate, the government and the
minority community. Moreover, we could easily extend the model to have a terrorist cell whose
attack possibilities depend on the strategies of the government and the minority community, and
which has an unknown outside option. This terrorist group would choose to attack if and only if
the probability that the attack is successful given its resources, multiplied with the value that the
terrorists attach to a successful attack, is larger than their outside option. We can think of the
function p(s;i) to be a reduced form of such a model with a strategic terrorist player.
Utility function of the minority community. In our model we assume that the minority
community shares the objective of preventing a terrorist attack. However, it is possible that the
community might have some preference for terrorism depending on the application of the model.
For example, consider an occupied country such as Iraq or Afghanistan. If the occupation army
ghts insurgents in a more active way, the risk of hitting innocent civilians increases and this leads
to stronger alienation between the occupation force and the population and also to possibly the
12community oering stronger support to the insurgents. In this case, i can measure the absence
of active support for the insurgent or terrorist organization, rather than the direct support of the
government's ght against the terrorists. Higher levels of government suppression may induce some
individuals to become terrorists, and make joining a terrorist organization a more acceptable or
even respected behavior in the community. The trade-o between active insurgency ghting and
risking the support of the population is the same as in our model.
6 Analysis
6.1 Equilibrium
We now analyze the equilibrium of our game. As already mentioned in the model section, voter
behavior at the election stage results in an ex-ante expected probability that the government is
reelected if there is no terror attack, q0, and an ex-ante expected probability that the government
is reelected if there is a terror attack, q1 < q0. It is useful to let Q  q0  q1 denote the equilibrium
eect of a terror attack on the government's reelection probability implied by voter behavior. In the
remainder, we can therefore focus on the interaction between government and minority community.
Substituting qi = E(vjT = i) in (1) and rearranging gives the government's objective function
Ug(0) + q0R   p(s;i)[g + QR]   cg(s) (3)
Maximizing this with respect to s implies that the government's optimal action is the solution of




 [g + QR]   c0
g(s) = 0 (4)
The optimization problem of the government is strictly concave in s, as the second derivative is
 
@2p(s;i)
@s2 [g + QR]   c00
g(s) < 0. Thus, there is a unique optimal level of s for any given level of
i; as a consequence, the government has a well-dened optimal response function. Moreover, as
(4) is continuous in i, the government's best response function is continuous and we can apply the






@s@i [g + QR]
 
@2p(s;i)
@s2 [g + QR]   c00
g(s)
: (5)
Since the denominator is negative and both terms in square brackets are positive, the sign of ds=di
is the opposite of the sign of
@2p(s;i)
@s@i . Thus, if government surveillance and community cooperation
are substitutes in preventing terror attacks, the optimal level of s decreases as i increases, and if
they are complements, then the optimal level of s increases as i increases.
The minority community's expected utility given in (2) is maximized over i, and its optimal





c(i) = 0: (6)
The minority community's objective function is strictly concave in i, as the second derivative with
respect to i is  
@2p(s;i)
@i2 c(s)   c00
c(i) < 0, because all terms are negative. By the same arguments
as above, the minority community's best response function is continuous, and we can apply the












@i2 c(s)   c00
c(i)
: (7)
The second term in the numerator is negative. Thus, a sucient (but not necessary) condition for
di
ds < 0 is
@2p(s;i)
@i@s > 0, i.e., the government's and the community's actions are substitutes. If instead
i and s are complements, then the sign of di
ds depends on the size of the countervailing eects.
The results so far imply the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The simultaneous game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof. Follows immediately from the fact that the best response functions are continuous and the
strategy spaces are bounded.
It is useful to focus on a setting where the pure strategy Nash equilibrium is stable. That is,
suppose we start with a pair of strategies (s0;i0) that are suciently close to, but dierent from
a Nash equilibrium (s;i). If a sequence of best responses converges towards the equilibrium, we
say that (s;i) is stable.
Denition 1. For given (s0;i0), dene the sequence f(st;it)gt=1;:::;1 recursively as follows: Let
st = s(it 1) and it = i(st). The Nash equilibrium (s;i) is locally stable if there exists " > 0 such
that, whenever jj(s0;i0)   (s;i)jj < ", then limt!1f(st;it)g = (s;i).
For example, suppose that i and s are substitutes in preventing a terrorist attack. In this
case, both reaction functions are downward-sloping. A Nash equilibrium is locally stable if the
reaction function s() is steeper than the reaction function i() at the equilibrium. Figure 1 shows
the convergence to the equilibrium starting from an initial point (s0;i0).
One can also easily check that, if i and s are substitutes and i() is steeper than s(), then the
equilibrium is unstable. Furthermore, if i0 < 0 and s0 > 0, then the equilibrium is stable, and if
both i0 > 0 and s0 > 0, then s() has to be steeper than i() for the equilibrium to be stable.
While stability is not a property of the equilibrium that is implied by our assumptions, it is a very
natural feature of the equilibrium. For example, in the case of substitutes, the equilibrium is stable
if the government's optimal action does not change too drastically with the level of cooperation
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Figure 1: A stable equilibrium if i and s are substitutes
Consider now how the equilibrium actions change in response to increased electoral incentives
to prevent a terror attack. Figure 2 shows the two reaction functions i(s) and s(i) for the case
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Figure 2: Reaction functions and equilibrium if i and s are substitutes
Since (3) is concave, a sucient condition for a parameter change to increase the optimal s
(for any level of i) is that the parameter change increases the left-hand side of (4). From this
argument it follows that an increase in the electoral incentives (i.e., in g + QR), or a decrease in
the government's marginal cost function c0
g, shifts the government's reaction function to the right:
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Figure 3: Reaction functions and equilibrium if i and s are complements
As a consequence, the equilibrium changes from (s;i) to (^ s;^ i). Thus, while the equilibrium
value of s increases, the equilibrium value of i decreases, and thus the eect on the overall probability
of a failing to prevent a terrorist attack is unclear. In fact, in a parametric example in Section 7,
we provide conditions under which this probability increases or decreases.
Figures 3(a) and 3(b) show the comparative static eects for the case that s and i are com-
plements (
@2p
@s@i < 0). Note that the shift of the government's reaction function to the right is
independent of whether
@2p
@s@i is positive or negative.
As argued above, when s and i are complements, the reaction function of the government is
always upward-sloping, while the slope of the community's reaction function may still be negative
(this is the case when the negative externality of s on c is large) or positive (in the opposite case)
The following Proposition 2 summarizes the comparative static eect of a small change in the
electoral incentives on the equilibrium values of the choice variables and the security level
Proposition 2. Assume that the equilibrium is locally stable and suppose that the government's




@s@i > 0 (i.e., if i and s are substitutes), then the equilibrium level of s increases and the




@s@i < 0 (i.e., if i and s are complements) and the reaction function of the minority, i(s)
is downward-sloping, then the equilibrium level of s increases and the equilibrium value of i
decreases. The overall eect on the equilibrium probability of a terror attack is ambiguous.
3. If
@2p
@s@i < 0 (i.e., if i and s are complements) and the reaction function of the minority, i(s) is
upward-sloping, then the equilibrium levels of i and s increase, and the probability of a terror
attack decreases.
16Proof. See text above.
Proposition 2 shows that increased incentives for the government always increase the equilibrium
level of s, even if we take the reaction of the minority community into account. However, the
security-enhancing aspect of a higher s is counteracted by a reduction of the equilibrium level of
i, as long as the minority community's reaction function is downward sloping. The overall eect
on the security level therefore depends on which of these eects is more important. Only if the
reaction function of the community is upward-sloping (i.e., the optimal level of cooperation for the
minority community increases when the government chooses a higher level of s), then the direct
eect of the incentives on the government and the strategic eect on the minority community go
in the same direction, and the probability of a terror attack is unambiguously reduced.
6.2 Commitment by the Government
The above analysis shows that increased anti-terror activity by the government possibly has the
undesired consequence of alienating the minority community, and that increased electoral incentives
to prevent a terror attack may result in the perverse eect of making such an attack more likely to
occur. In such a setting, it appears desirable if the government could constrain itself from being too
intrusive and ex-ante commit to a particular value of s. One way of modeling such commitment is
by assuming that the government moves rst and the community observes s before deciding on i.
As we prove in the appendix, the result that the equilibrium level of i is weakly greater in the
sequential game than in the simultaneous game holds for general functional forms.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the government can commit to a level of s that is observed before
the minority community chooses its action. In this case, the equilibrium level of cooperation by the
community, i, is larger than in the game in which government and community move simultaneously.
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, in contrast to the simultaneous game, it is guaranteed in the sequential game that an
increase in the incentives of the government to prevent a terror attack translates into a reduced
equilibrium probability of a terror attack. As we show in the Appendix, this result holds generally,
independent of the specic functional forms:
Proposition 4. Suppose that the government can commit to a level of s that is observed before the
minority community chooses its action. In this case, an increase in the incentives of the government
to prevent a terror attack (at least weakly) decreases the equilibrium probability of a terror attack.
Proof. See Appendix.
6.3 Commitment, First Move and Observability
The previous subsection shows that if the government commits to an action, an increase in the
government's incentives to foil a terrorist attack leads to a lower probability of such an attack. The
17sequential game also gives a payo to the government that is at least as large as its payo in the
game where community and government move simultaneously. This raises the question of how the
government can implement commitment in practice. The main point that we want to make in this
section is that commitment in the context of government anti-terrorism activity and infringement
on civil liberties requires some constitutional or legal constraints on the government, together with
a credible enforcement of these rules by the judiciary. In contrast, if we amend the framework of
the game in a realistic way, a simple change in the order of moves to a sequential one is unlikely to
lead to an outcome that diers from the outcome of the simultaneous game.
In the previous subsection, we assume that the minority community can exactly and without
cost observe the exact level of anti-terrorist policy chosen by the government. In the context of anti-
terrorism, it would certainly appear that this assumption is unrealistic as a literal interpretation,
because many anti-terrorism actions require a certain secrecy to be eective at all. Thus, it is
important to analyze what would happen in a sequential game if we relax the assumption of exact
observability and instead assume that the minority group receives a signal that is correlated (but
not perfectly so) with the government's action. The logic of our argument follows Bagwell (1995).
Specically, suppose that for any action s the government chooses, the minority community
observes the realization x of a random variable X which stochastically depends on the action s. We
assume that the conditional probability density function j(xjs) satises j(xjs) > 0 for all x 2 X
and s 2 [0;s]. For example, suppose that X = s+", so that the signal x is equal to the true value s
plus an \observation error" " that could be distributed according to a normal distribution N(0;2).
Denote by (x;y) the minority community's posterior belief that the government's action s is no
larger than y, conditional on observing the signal x. Since every value of x arises on the equilibrium
path, all beliefs are pinned down by Bayes' rule. A pure strategy of the minority community in
this framework is a function iseq() that maps signals x into actions.
Proposition 5. A pair of strategies (s;iseq()) is a pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium of
the sequential game with imperfect observability if and only if iseq(x) = i for all x, and (s;i) is
a pure strategy equilibrium of the simultaneous game.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, in any pure strategy equilibrium, the minority community correctly anticipates
the government's equilibrium action, and therefore its own equilibrium action is independent of the
signal observed. But then, if the government anticipates that the minority community's equilibrium
action is independent of the signal the community observes it chooses its best response for the given
minority community's equilibrium action. Thus, only actions s and i that are best replies to each
other are can arise on the equilibrium path of the sequential game with imperfect observability.
A similar argument for the equivalence of the simultaneous and the sequential game can be
made by assuming that the government's action is not costlessly observable, but rather that the
minority community has to choose whether to pay a (possibly arbitrarily small) cost  to observe the
government's action. In this case, the only pure strategy equilibria are the ones of the simultaneous
18game. To see this, note that in a pure strategy equilibrium, the minority community has no
incentive to pay the observation cost and thus will choose an action that is independent of the
actual action of the government. But in that case, the government will choose its optimal response
against the expected action of the minority community, and therefore the only equilibrium actions
are those that are equilibrium actions in the simultaneous version of the game.
In summary, these results strongly suggest that the government cannot expect to commit to
an ex-post suboptimal level of s, if s is not perfectly and costlessly observed. Furthermore, perfect
and costless observability is a very implausible assumption for the issue of government anti-terror
measures, and thus the equilibrium of the game in which government and minority community move
simultaneously appears to be the plausible equilibrium if there are no other explicit commitment
mechanisms.
7 A parametric example
The following simple parametric example analyzes a setting in which i and s are substitutes. It
allows us to analyze precise conditions (within the framework of the example) under which the
probability of a terror attack decreases or increases with electoral incentives.
We assume that p(s;i) = e s + (1   )e i.5. Furthermore, the cost functions are linear in s
and i, respectively: cg(s) = kgs and cc(i) = kci. The utility of the community in case of an attack
is Uc(1;s) =  u=(1+s), while it is Uc(0;s) = ( u+)=(1+s) in case of no attack. Note that s reduces
the community's utility in both states, and that the dierence between the utility in both states,
=(1 + s), is also decreasing in s.
7.1 Simultaneous Interaction
We rst consider what happens when government and minority community move simultaneously.
The government's problem is
max
s [1   e s   (1   )e i](g + QR)   kgs (8)







as the government's optimal action (provided that this is positive, and s = 0 otherwise). Note
that this level of s is independent of the level of i chosen by the community.
The minority community maximizes
max
i




5This specication can be interpreted as one in which government and community actions each aect dierent
\areas", in which the probability of an attack cannot be aected by the other player.





















provided that this is positive, and i = 0 otherwise. From now on, we focus on an interior equilib-
rium in which s > 0 and i > 0. Substituting the equilibrium values into p(), the probability of













+ ln(g + QR)
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(13)


















Thus, if the ratio of the \valuations" that the government and the minority community get from
preventing a terror attack, respectively, is already larger than the ratio of the cost parameters, then
a further increase in the government's incentives to prevent a terror attack (i.e., in either g, or
Q, or R) actually increases the equilibrium probability of one occurring.
Intuitively, an increase in the government's incentives increases the equilibrium value of s (see
(9)), but the increased s decreases the cooperation that can be obtained from the minority group.
The dilemma of the government is that, while a higher level of s prevents some terror attacks, it
also increases the cost for the minority to cooperate and thus decreases the level of cooperation.
As shown, this strategic eect may outweigh the direct benet of higher government motivation.
Note that (15) is independent of , which is surprising, as it would appear intuitive that the
\perverse" eect of electoral incentives lowering the equilibrium security level is more (less) likely to
obtain if the importance of the minority community's action is large (small). Indeed, the result that
(15) is independent of  only obtains in an interior equilibrium, and for extreme values of  only one
of the players chooses positive eort. If  ! 1, i.e. almost only the government's actions matter for
eective terror prevention, then i = 0, as the right-hand side of (12) is negative. In this case, an
increase of g +QR has only the direct eect of increasing s, while the strategic eect on i is zero.
Thus, for  close to 1, stronger electoral incentives necessarily lower the equilibrium probability
of an attack. In this sense, the interesting \perverse" comparative static eect requires that the
eect of the minority community's actions is suciently strong. However, once this importance
20reaches a certain threshold so that the equilibrium is interior, the direction of the electoral eect
is independent of .
7.2 Sequential Interaction
If the government can commit to a level of s which is perfectly and costlessly observable by the
minority community, then the optimal action of the minority community is given by (11). Note








Dierentiating with respect to s gives
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along the equilibrium path. Comparing (18) with (9) shows that the government's optimal level of
s is lower in the sequential game, and hence (using i0(s) < 0), the equilibrium value of i is higher in
the sequential game. Thus, from the point of view of minimizing the probability of a terror attack,
a sequential game has advantages and disadvantages.






































Thus, in contrast to the simultaneous game, it is guaranteed in the sequential game that an increase
21in the incentives of the government to prevent a terror attack translates into a reduced equilibrium
probability of a terror attack.
In which game is the probability of a terror attack larger? Comparing (13) and (20), it is easy















> e   1  1:71: (22)
Thus, if the incentives of the government to prevent an attack relative to costs are substantially
larger than the cost-benet ratio for the minority community, then the equilibrium probability of
a terror attack is lower in the sequential game.
8 Discussion and Policy Implications
8.1 Mechanisms for Commitment
Our results suggest that, whenever the minority community's reaction to an increase in govern-
ment surveillance s is to reduce their level of cooperation i, then it would be in the government's
interest to commit to a lower level of s than the equilibrium level. However, Section 6.3, in partic-
ular Proposition 5, shows that, under reasonable assumptions about the observability of its anti-
terrorism policy, the government cannot achieve commitment by simply \moving rst". Rather,
we argue that commitment requires either explicit mechanisms that constrain the policy choices of
the government, mechanisms that restrict the government's preferences for reelection, or strategic
delegation by voters to politicians with dierent preferences.
Checks and Balances on the Government's Actions. After 9/11, the United States and
other Western democracies passed emergency laws and engaged in a range of aggressive countert-
errorism measures such as coercive interrogation, ethnic proling, interception of communications
and preventive arrests and detention. Although these measures may have prevented potential ter-
rorist attacks,6 they have also being widely criticized for violating human rights. The scholarly
and policy argument in favor of these aggressive actions is that there is a trade-of between security
and liberty, and in times of national emergencies such as the aftermath of 9/11, the security-liberty
balance should shift in favor of security (Posner and Vermeule 2007, Posner 2007).
Our analysis suggests that counter-majoritarian checks and balances on emergency legislation
and the government's aggressive counterterrorism actions can be a useful tool to achieve com-
6The actual eectiveness of the most controversial of these measures | torture or enhanced interrogation, de-
pending on one's point of view | is in dispute. While former Bush administration ocials such as Vice President
Dick Cheney claim that waterboarding prevented specic new terror attacks, these claims have not been veried.
22mitment. An important counter-majoritarian check is exercised by the judicial branch. Courts
equipped with the power of judicial review can enforce constitutional commitments to rights and
invalidate emergency legislation that infringes on human rights even if the legislation might work in
preventing terrorism. When using its checks and balances power, the judiciary guarantees a certain
level of rights protections and keeps the government's commitment to less aggressive counterter-
rorism actions. Our argument for judicial checks and balances does not require that the courts
observe the counterterrorism actions chosen by the government perfectly. As long as the court's
signal is close to the true policy with a suciently high probability, excessive counterterrorism can
be deterred even by an imperfect court system.
An example of a law that creates judicial checks and balances and increases the cost of govern-
ment surveillance is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). FISA prescribes procedures
for the physical and electronic surveillance and collection of \foreign intelligence information" be-
tween \foreign powers" and \agents of foreign powers" (which may include American citizens and
permanent residents suspected of being engaged in espionage and violating U.S. law on territory
under United States control). The act limits warrantless surveillance and thus requires that the gov-
ernment either obtains a surveillance warrant by showing probable cause in a special court. Thus,
the act increases the government's cost of engaging in surveillance and likely leads to a reduction
of surveillance activity, relative to a scenario in which the government is completely unconstrained.
However, for the judicial checks and balances to work as a commitment device, the courts need
to enforce the nation's laws and constitution even in times of emergency. A common observation
is that \in times of war, the law falls silent" (\inter arma enim silent leges"). Courts may not
necessarily enforce legal violations by executive ocials in times of emergency. However, judicial
review only works as an eective commitment device if breaking the laws is costly for government
ocials. This requires at least that elected ocials who are considering breaking the laws face some
probability of being punished for their behavior in a court of law. The commitment opportunity
aorded by judicial review constraining government behavior disappears if there is a culture of
impunity within the government, in particular for transgressions committed \in good faith".
Suppose that Congress passes a law that prohibits certain infringements of civil liberties and
that this creates the expectation that the government will adhere to the law. If sanctions are
not enforced ex-post, though, the government always has an incentive to increase its level of anti-
terrorist measures over the extent that the law allows for, and all these transgressions could be
in \good faith" (i.e., undertaken with the sole objective of lowering the probability of a terrorist
attack). However, if all ocials who break the law can expect to be pardoned by the president
because of their impeccable motivations that induced them to break the law, then the law eectively
does not aord commitment to the government. We believe that this is an important and, to our
knowledge, novel argument that applies, for example, to the question whether government ocials
should be prosecuted for ordering torture of suspected or actual terrorists, even if it were true that
torture sometimes \works" in obtaining information that can be used to thwart terrorist attacks).
23Term limits. By denition, a government that faces a term limit has no incentive to adjust its
policy in order to increase the likelihood to gain reelection. In most settings, this is an argument
against term limits, as a government with a term limit has a lower incentive to work for the common
good than one that can be reelected. However, in our model, stronger incentives to achieve the
common good may actually have the perverse eect of making the achievement of the common good
less likely in equilibrium. Whenever this is true, term limits are a welfare-improving institution in
our setting.
Strategic delegation. In our model, politicians have preferences that are very similar to those
of voters, except for their desire to win reelection. In a scenario in which the government plays
a game with other actors such as here, it may well be the case that voters can obtain a higher
equilibrium payo if they strategically select the type of agent who plays the game for them.7 We
now discuss several possible implementations of this idea in our framework.
The government in our model is of the type that James Madison describes in Federalist 57
where he argues that the best representative is one that works on achieving the common good but
also is responsive to electoral pressures.8 However, our analysis suggests that such \Madisonian"
representatives might lead to inecient social outcomes. A mechanism to restrict the government's
preference for reelection is to select a government that does not care for reelection (or, at least, puts
a lower weight on the reelection payo). Edmund Burke argued for this type of politicians who care
exclusively about achieving the common good and have no direct preference for reelection. If we
think of dierent politicians' preferences in our model as continuum from those Burkean trustees
to the \Madisonian" representatives, then our analysis suggests that in the context of terrorism
prevention it is benecial to select a representative government more on the Burkean end of the
spectrum.
One can also think of the cost function cg(s) as at least partially reecting the preferences and
attitudes of the policy maker. Dierent politicians such as George W. Bush and Barak Obama are
likely to care dierentially about civil liberties, and are therefore inclined to implement dierent
anti-terror policies. Strategic delegation to a politician with dierent preferences can thus serve
as a credible commitment device. The results of our model suggest that the representative voter
should optimally delegate the execution of anti-terror policy to a politician who is more concerned
about civil liberties or the nation's image in the world than the representative voter himself.
8.2 Minority Rights and Terrorism Prevention
Scholars have debated two important aspects of expanding the government's antiterrorism activities
in its distributive aspects and its impact on fundamental human rights. Jeremy Waldron analyzes
7There are several models in political economy that explore the idea of strategic delegation to decision makers
whose preferences dier from those of the pivotal voter. See, for example, Rogo (1985), Messner and Polborn (2004),
Dal Bo (2006) or Klumpp (2007).
8Andrew Rehfeld argues this is precisely the kind of representation that James Madison was defending in his
contributions to The Federalist.
24the issue of distribution in the context of terrorism prevention and notes that not all members
of society have their civil liberties and rights infringe equally. Members of minority groups are
more likely to face civil liberties losses and this fact raises the question of fairness (Waldron 2003).
In fact, it is quite plausible that the degree to which a particular anti-terror activity is perceived
as impacting disproportionately the minority community inuences the extent to which the policy
leads to alienation. This may provide a justication for some security policies that appear blatantly
inecient given the nature of the terrorist threat. For example, the identity of people who have
to undergo secondary (special) inspection at airports seems to be determined rather randomly. If,
instead of also inspecting travelers whose appearance suggests strongly that they do not pose a
terrorist threat (say, women over the age of 60), secondary inspections were targeted much more
to Muslim-looking men between 20 and 40 years of age, then the probability of nding something
relevant may slightly increase. However, such a discriminatory policy would also be certain to
destroy much more crucially needed goodwill in the Muslim community, and may therefore overall
be much less ecient than a policy of untargeted secondary inspections.
Researchers also note that ethnic and religious proling in the context of terrorism prevention
constitutes breaches fundamental human rights norms and raises issues of discrimination and equal-
ity under the law (Goldston 2006). If the government relies on ethnic, racial, or religious stereotypes
in its counterterrorism action, such ethnic proling breaches one of the most fundamental principles
of law in a liberal democracy: each person must be treated as an individual, not as a member of
a group. Furthermore, ethnic proling trumps the presumption of innocence upon which criminal
investigation is based in a rule of law system.
Our model suggests that electoral pressure to be successful in preventing terrorism induces the
government to increase its targeting of ethnic and minority communities. The analysis shows that
excessive government targeting minority communities can arise as an equilibrium outcome even if
it is counterproductive (i.e., reduces the equilibrium security level).
9 Conclusions
In this paper, we show that electoral pressure to be successful in preventing terrorism induces the
government to increase its level of anti-terrorism activities directed at ethnic and religious minority
groups. However, the overall eect may be a decrease of security, because electoral pressure of being
successful in terrorism prevention creates a commitment problem: Specically, the government
intensies policies that are under its direct control, but the cooperation of minority communities,
which may be crucial for the success of an anti-terror policy, decreases. This strategic eect may
dominate the direct one so that an increase in electoral pressures has the eect of possibly increasing
the likelihood of a terrorist attack. If the government can commit ex-ante, it will always do this
in a way to increase the equilibrium cooperation of the minority community. We argue that the
inherently imperfect observability of anti-terrorist activities makes it hard for the government to
commit to enacting a policy that is not optimal for it ex-post, and we discuss several institutional
25features that may aord at least some degree of commitment.
It may be interesting to integrate a terrorist organization as an active player in our model
framework of electoral accountability when the terrorist organization is also interested in inuencing
the government's future policy and/or the identity of the government. Such a model would likely
require a multi-period dynamic framework, and is left for future research.
Finally, the general principle that we identify in this paper, namely the connection between
increased electoral accountability and the possibility of a perverse eect on the policy outcome,
can certainly be applied in other policy elds as well. The same causation mechanisms apply
more generally whenever the government needs to cooperate with independent actors to achieve
the desired policy outcome. For example, some environmental problems such as global warming
require the cooperation of many countries. If electoral pressure to solve a particular problem
increases in one country, the government of that country will increase its eort to reach a solution,
but the governments of other countries may react to the change strategically in a way that partially
osets, or even more than osets this direct eect. A similar framework may also be fruitful in
other policy issues that require international cooperation, such as nuclear non-proliferation.
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Proof of Proposition 3. The government's rst order condition in the simultaneous game is given










 [g + Q  R]   c0
g(s) = 0: (23)
Note that the left hand side of (23) is smaller than the left hand side of (4) if and only if i0(s) < 0;
in this case, the optimal s is smaller in the sequential game than in the simultaneous game, and
consequently (since i0(s) < 0), the optimal level of i is larger in the sequential game.
Conversely, if i0(s) > 0, the left hand side of (23) is greater than the left hand side of (4); thus,
in this case, the optimal s is greater in the sequential game than in the simultaneous game, and
consequently (since i0(s) > 0), the optimal level of i is larger in the sequential game.









i.e., the electoral incentives are stronger in case 2 than in case 1. Denote the solution of the
government's problem in case 1 by si, and denote the corresponding equilibrium probability by pi;









as s2 is a feasible choice and cannot get the government a higher payo than the optimal action s1.












g + Q1R1   2
g + Q2R2
 0: (26)
Since the term in square brackets is negative by assumption, it must be true that p1  p2, as
claimed.
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider rst the if-part of the proposition. Observe that, if the govern-
ment plays pure strategy s in equilibrium, the community's belief must place probability 1 to the
event that the government chooses action s, no matter what signal x the minority community ob-
serves (as any observed signal is consistent with the government having chosen s). Given this belief,
action i maximizes the community's expected utility (by the fact that i is an optimal response
to s in the simultaneous game). Finally, given that the community chooses i independent of the
signal received, the government's optimal action is s. This proves that (s;iseq(x) = i for all x)
is a pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the sequential game with imperfect observability.
27Consider now the only-if-part of the proposition. Assume, by way of contradiction, that s = s0
in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, where s0 is not part of any pure strategy equilibrium of the
simultaneous game. Since we have a pure strategy equilibrium, the community's belief must place
probability 1 on s0, and thus iseq(x) = i(s0) for all x (where i() is the optimal response function
from the static game). However, since the community's action i(s0) is independent of the signal, it
must be the case that s0 maximizes the government's utility, given that the community plays i(s0),
i.e. s0 = s(i(s0)). But this contradicts the assumption that (s0;i(s0)) is not an equilibrium of the
simultaneous game.
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